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Segregation of Grain Markets: 
Consequences for Price Behavior 
Kevin McNew and Vincent H. Smith 
The introduction of genetically modified grain and oilseed products at the farm level 
and  resistance for these products by consumer groups have led to segmentation in grain 
markets. This study explores  the  implications for market  price behavior for a segregated 
soybean market for genetically modified (GM) and non-GM varieties. A stochastic 
dynamic simulation model of production and  storage is solved, andMonte Carlo simula- 
tion procedures are  used to examine price behavior between GM and non-GM soybeans. 
The results suggest important differences in price behavior between GM and non-GM 
soybeans. The results obtained in the model simulations are compared with evidence 
from the Tokyo Grain Exchange, where non-GM and GM  soybean futures contracts 
have traded simultaneously since May 2000. The evidence from the Tokyo Grain 
Exchange contracts is largely consistent with the  results of the simulation model. Price 
correlations between the Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GM and GM  soybean contracts 
tended to be similar in magnitude to those found in the simulations. 
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Introduction 
Genetic engineering of  crops represents a substantial breakthrough in agricultural 
technology. In the United States, the most widely used applications of this technology 
are BT Corn and Roundup ~ead~@  Soybeans, first introduced in 1995. These first- 
generation transgenic crops are designed to lower farm production costs by reducing 
input costs and, as a result, have been rapidly adopted by U.S. farmers. In 1996, for 
example, less than 10% of the total areas planted to corn and soybeans in the United 
States consisted of genetically modified (GM) varieties. By 2002, over 35% of U.S. corn 
acreage and 75% of U.S. soybean acreage were planted to GM crops. 
While many  US.  farmers have embraced this technology, many consumers have been 
more skeptical because of  perceived health and environmental risks. Consumer and 
environmental groups in the European Union and Japan, both of  which are major 
buyers of U.S. grain commodities, have been especially vocal about these concerns. As 
a result, some foreign food manufacturers have decided not to accept GM  crops al- 
together, others have developed plans to institute labeling programs, and some foreign 
governments have introduced regulations requiring labeling and, in some cases, product 
segregation for GM products.' 
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To the extent that consumers  with preferences for non-GM products also purchase organic products, evidence from empir- 
ical studies of the demand for organic products such as  organic milk may be relevant. Recent research suggests some U.S. 
consumers are  willing to pay premiums for these products, but own-price elasticities of demand are  larger than  for competing 
non-organic products (Glaser and Thompson). McNew and Smith  Segregation of Grain Markets: Consequences  for Price Behavior  35 
The short-run reaction by participants in the U.S. grain market has been to segregate 
commodities by GM and non-GM varieties. A 1999 survey found that 11%  of  all Midwest 
grain elevators were segregating corn and 8% were segregating soybeans, with more 
elevators expected to segregate in the future [U.S. Department ofAgriculture,  Economic 
Research Service (USDAIERS)  2000al. As a result of segregation, price differences have 
begun to emerge with non-GM crops at  a premium to GM  crops. However, only limited 
anecdotal evidence is available on the size of  these premiums, and there is even less 
information about how these premiums will behave in the future. In addition, the U.S. 
markets for GM  and non-GM commodities are relatively unsophisticated, consisting of 
spot cash exchanges and contracts for delivery, but no futures or options contracts. For 
soybeans, however, GM  and non-GM soybean futures contracts have been available on 
the Tokyo Grain Exchange since 2000. 
Most previous research on GM  issues has been related to welfare effects and the dis- 
tribution of benefits (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolvesky; Kalaitzandonakes) as well as 
consumer issues such as food safety and labeling (Caswell 1998, 2000; Caswell and 
Mojduszka; Hobbs and Plunkett; McCluskey; Feldman, Morris, and Harrington). This 
study explores issues concerning how segregated U.S. grain markets for GM  and non- 
GM  soybeans are likely to behave. Segregation does not just separate production and 
demand along GM  and non-GM lines. It also requires that inventories, a key element 
in determining price behavior in grain markets, be segregated as well. 
In addition, because demands for GM  and non-GM products may differ with respect 
to price elasticities and demandvariability, such differences  may have important effects 
on the storage function in each market, and therefore on relative price behavior for GM 
and non-GM commodities. One important issue is whether segregated markets result 
in greater price instability. A second concern is what will be the long-run average level 
and the volatility of the price spread between GM and non-GM crops. If the price spread 
is unstable, separate forward pricing markets for GM andnon-GM  products may become 
both viable and, from an economic welfare perspective, desirable. 
In this study, these issues are investigated in the context of  a dynamic model of the 
markets for two commodities  (GM and non-GM varieties ofthe same crop, soybeans)  that 
are linked through constraints on production and storage and face stochastic demands. 
Simulations of market price behavior under alternative assumptions about the segrega- 
tion of the market for soybeans reveal that price differences between GM  and non-GM 
varieties reflect differences in production costs but are sufficiently volatile to suggest 
that separate  futures markets may emerge. Comparisons of the simulation results with 
the actual performance of futures contracts for GM  and non-GM soybeans on the Tokyo 
Grain Exchange indicate that correlations between GM  and non-GM soybean prices 
obtained from the simulation model are consistent with actual market behavior. 
A Market Model of Variety Segregation 
Price behavior in grain markets is a function of  several important attributes, including 
a significant time lag between planting and harvesting, uncertainty about yields and 
prices at harvest time, and the ability of market participants to store the commodity 
from one year to the next. These characteristics  also exist when the market is segregated 
by sub-commodity  groups such as  GM and non-GM soybeans, although subtle differences 
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First, in a segregated market, farmers must now decide whether to produce GM  or 
non-GM crops, and in what amounts, with an eye to differences in the expected harvest 
prices for each variety and differences in per unit production costs. Second, in a non- 
segregated market, demand is aggregated across both varieties, but in a segregated 
market, the demands are disaggregated  by GM  and non-GM varieties. Moreover, in the 
segregated market, the demand functions for the GM  and non-GM varieties are likely 
to have different price elasticities and stochastic properties. As a consequence, not only 
must separate stockpiles of  GM  and non-GM crops be maintained, but also storage 
behavior may be inherently different and result in distinct behavior for the price of  GM 
and non-GM crops. 
The model presented in this section is similar in approach to the work of Williams and 
Wright on competitive storage which has been used in other applications by Miranda 
and Glauber (1993,1995);  Makki, Tweeten, and Miranda; and McNew and Gardner. An 
important difference here is that the model accounts for two distinct but related com- 
modities (GM and non-GM crops) for which the separate demands may have different 
elasticities and stochastic properties. 
More formally, suppose the farm-level demand for GM  and non-GM crops in year t 
can be represented as: 
where D is quantity demanded,  Pis  price, and e represents a zero-mean random shock. 
The random shocks eg and en  are independent with potentially different variances. The 
indices  g and n refer to GM  and non-GM, respectively. Equation (1)  defines the farm- 
level demand functions, but price behavior is determined through the interplay of  pro- 
duction decisions, random shocks, and inventories as described below. 
On the supply side of  the model, production of  each crop variety is assumed to occur 
once a year. We assume the total area planted to soybeans is fured at  A  with farmers 
deciding each year the relative acreage of  each variety to plant, such that: 
where A;  and A;  are, respectively, the acreages planted to GM  and non-GM crops in 
year t. 
Crops planted in year t are assumed to be harvested the following year, t +1, with a 
random yield, Y,,,,  which for purposes of convenience is assumed to be identical for GM 
and non-GM crops. Farmers' production costs are assumed to be identical across produ- 
cers for each variety and vary only with respect to the variety planted; that is, GM  and 
non-GM varieties have different per acre production costs. Specifically, we assume the 
per acre total cost of producing a non-GM variety is a constant, c, and the per acre total 
cost of  producing a GM  variety is c -m, where m is a positive constant; i.e., because 
yields are assumed to be identical, the GM variety is cheaper to produce. These assump- 
tions imply that  per acre total production costs for the entire crop (both GM and non-GM 
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If no GM  crops are produced, then per acre total production costs would be c. However, 
the introduction of a lower-cost GM variety reduces production costs by the per acre cost 
savings (m)  multiplied by the share of  total acreage planted to the GM  crop. 
As a group, farmers are assumed to be risk-neutral and rational, so that acreage deci- 
sions are made on the basis of  the expected price relative to the cost. The equilibrium 
condition for a representative farmer's soybean planting decision is written as: 
Atg  +A; =A. 
This condition ensures that in a market equilibrium, the difference between the 
expected per acre revenues from the GM  and non-GM varieties equals the difference in 
per acre costs.2 
In period t +  1,  the market-level quantity of each crop available for sale or storage con- 
sists of new production and inventories carried over from period t.  The market-clearing 
condition for GM  and non-GM crops is therefore: 
(5)  HL1 + If = Df+l + IAl,  for i =g,  n, 
where H,',,  = %+,A  f is period t + 1  production, DL, is period t + 1  quantity consumed, and 
It is the inventory carried from period t to period t + 1. 
Assuming physical storage costs are  identical for GM and non-GM crops at  a constant 
rate of k, and the nonstochastic  interest rate is r,  it follows that intertemporal arbitrage 
will ensure inventories satisfy the following equilibrium conditions: 
The first condition is the usual intertemporal arbitrage condition that expected profits 
from storage are exhausted. The second condition assures nonnegative inventories. The 
third condition states that if stocks are carried, then the intertemporal arbitrage condi- 
tion must be satisfied as  an equality. If the arbitrage condition is negative, implying the 
current price exceeds the difference between the discounted value of  the expected price 
next period less storage costs, then inventories are depleted (i.e., they are zero). 
In addition to the intertemporal arbitrage condition, we also impose a cross-product 
arbitrage condition: 
This condition arises from the assumption that the non-GM variety can be used to satisfy 
the demand for the GM variety, but not vice versa. As a result, the price spread between 
the non-GM and the GM  variety cannot be negative. 
The solution to this dynamic problem yields a functional expression for the controls 
in terms of  the states. Here, there are two state variables, the total supply of the GM 
and non-GM crops, Sf and S;. The controls are the inventory  variables and the acreage 
decisions. Specifically, the functions are: 
We abstract from total soybean acreage decisions as well as  shifts in acreage among competing  crops, such as corn. Such 
decisions likely have small impacts on our analysis of price behavior between GM  and non-GM soybeans. 38  April2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
S:  = I,'_~  + %A:,  for i =g,  n. 
While the distributions for the yield and demand disturbances are imbedded in these 
solutions, there is no closed-form solution for the unknown functionals described above. 
Current storage decisions are affected by future storage decisions and, when combined 
with the nonnegativity constraint, this creates an equilibrium storage relationship that 
is analytically intractable. However, numerical solution techniques are available for 
solving this stochastic dynamic programming problem. 
While analytical results cannot be obtained, the arbitrage conditions  indicate the price 
spread between the two commodities will increase as  the cost difference between the two 
commodities  increases. In addition, it  is likely that increases in the volatility of demand 
for each variety will increase the volatility of their relative prices and reduce the corre- 
lation between those prices. Differences in demand elasticities between the two varieties 
may also affect the volatility of  their relative prices and the correlation between those 
prices. These potential relationships are examined through an empirical version of  the 
above model which is based on the structure of  the U.S. soybean market. 
Parameter Estimates 
Solving the stochastic dynamic programming model presented in the previous section 
requires estimates of  market parameters, including elasticities of  demand for GM  and 
non-GM varieties of the crop, as  well as the size of random shocks for yields and market 
demands. This section presents estimates of these parameters for the U.S. soybean 
market. 
Segregation  between GM and non-GM soybean varieties is a fairly recent event. Thus 
no adequate data are available on prices and quantities traded for GM  and non-GM 
soybeans, precluding direct econometric  estimation of disaggregated market demand 
parameters for GM and non-GM soybeans. To address this problem, we assume the 
demand for GM  and non-GM products can be disaggregated into a domestic component 
representing the demand for GM varieties and an export component representing the 
demand for non-GM ~arieties.~ 
Some previous estimates of domestic and export demand elasticities are available in 
the literature. Gardiner and Dixit, for example, reported a point estimate of  the aggre- 
gate export demand price elasticity  for U.S. soybeans of  -0.96, while Moschini, Lapan, and 
Sobolevsky estimate the domestic demand elasticity for soybeans to be -0.40. However, 
the export demand estimates presented by Gardiner and Dixit were obtained using data 
prior to the mid-1980s. Relatively recent changes in the world market for soybeans sug- 
gest these estimates may not accurately represent the current situation. In particular, 
The assumption that export demand can be used as a proxy for the market demand for non-GM products produced in the 
United States stems &om the fact that resistance to GM  varieties is widespread in several major export markets, including 
the EU and Japan as well as some other markets like South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Hong Kong which have 
announced plans to institute GM  labeling regulations (USDAIERS 2000b). Although some U.S. food manufacturers have 
turned to non-GM products, at  this stage the bulk of the segregation seems to be occurring in the export market. McNew and Smith  Segregation of Grain Markets: Consequences  for Price Behavior  39 
soybean production in South  America expanded substantially  in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Thus, we utilize new econometric estimates of  both domestic and export demands for 
soybeans using annual soybean data for the marketing years 1970 to 2000. Details of 
the econometric models, estimation methods, and results are  presented in the appendix. 
The econometric results presented in appendix table A1 show, for the period 1985- 
2000, the estimated own-price export demand elasticity (estimated to be -  1.61) is much 
larger in absolute terms than the own-price elasticity estimate for the period 1970-1984 
(-0.84). It  is also larger in absolute terms than the estimate of  -0.96 reported by Gardiner 
and Dixit. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the export elasticity for 
U.S.  soybeans increased in the 1990s. The results also provide point estimates of  the 
price elasticity  for domestic soybean demand of  -0.56 for the period 1970-1984 and -0.31 
for the period 1985-2000. These estimates are quite similar to the estimate of  -0.40 
reported by Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky. 
The standard errors of the estimated domestic and export demand functions were also 
used to compute coefficients of  variation for each estimated equation, which are esti- 
mated consistently with the price elasticity estimates reported in appendix table Al. 
These coefficients ofvariation are utilized to establish distributions from which demand 
shocks are drawn in the simulation models. Specifically, multiplying the estimated 
coefficient of variation for the domestic model and the export model by the average price 
over the sample gives a standard deviation estimate for the distribution of  the demand 
shocks for each market. These standard deviation estimates are used to obtain domestic 
and export demand shocks that are assumed  to be independent and normally distributed 
with zero means. 
In the simulation model's supply side, GM and non-GM per acre yields are assumed 
to be identical and to be normally distributed with a mean of  38 bushels and a standard 
deviation of  three bushels. These estimates are based on a trend-line linear regression 
of U.S. average soybean yields for 1985-2000, where the residuals are used to compute 
the standard deviation and mean yield is based on the expected yield for the year 2000. 
Utilizing estimates reported by Marra, Carlson, and Hubbel, the cost savings associ- 
ated with producing GM  soybean varieties are assumed to be $6 per acre. Total U.S. 
soybean acreage is assumed to be fxed  at  73 million acres, although, as discussed above, 
the mix between GM  and non-GM crops is determined endogenously. Given the 
estimated parameters for the import and export demand functions, if the mean yield of 
38 bushels per acre is realized on the total soybean area of  73 million acres, stocks 
remain constant, and the market for U.S. soybeans is not segregated between GM  and 
non-GM varieties, then, in the absence of  any shocks to aggregate demand (domestic or 
GM  demand plus export or non-GM demand), the market will clear at an equilibrium 
price of  $5.75 per bushel. 
Finally, to complete the parameterizaton of  the model, annual storage costs are as- 
sumed to be 12~  per bushel, and the real interest rate is assumed to be 5%.  The resulting 
empirical model is used to simulate market behavior over time. Results of  the simula- 
tions are reported in the next section. 
Simulation Results 
Simulation methods are used to explore the implications of market segregation  between 
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first  to assess what the broad impact of  market segregation should be, and second, to 
determine the sensitivity of the results to key parameters, including the size of demand 
shocks and price elasticities of  demand. 
In each scenario,  the simulation procedure is as  follows. First, the stochastic dynamic 
programming problem is solved numerically. The numerical solution provides decision 
rules for the stockpiling of  GM  and non-GM crops as well as for the allocation of  land 
between the GM  and non-GM crops. These decision rules change based on the state of 
nature, which in this case is represented by the total supplies of  GM and non-GM crops 
in a given year. 
Based on the numerical solution, a Monte Carlo simulation is then used to generate 
random shocks to yield and demands, and to generate equilibrium prices, stocks, and 
quantities. For each scenario, 1,000 replications are produced, and each replication 
consists of 300 observations  where each observation represents one period in the model. 
The average values over the 1,000  replications  for each simulation are  reported in tables 
1  and 2.4 
In  the initial simulation, we assume there is no segregation  between GM and non-GM 
crops. In this case, aggregate demand is the sum of  the export demand and domestic 
demand functions. No  price difference exists between GM  and non-GM soybeans. All 
acreage  is  utilized in the production of soybeans, and no distinction is made between GM 
and non-GM ~arieties.~ 
The second simulation assumes the market is segmented between GM  and non-GM 
soybeans. Market demand for the GM variety is based on the domestic demand equation, 
while market demand for the non-GM variety is based on the export demand equation. 
Producers allocate the fixed total soybean acreage between the GM and non-GM crops. 
The results of these two simulations (without segregation and with segregation) are 
reported in table 1. In the absence of variety segregation, the average soybean price is 
$5.80 per bushel. When segregation is implemented, the price of  non-GM soybeans 
increases to $5.88 per bushel, while the price of  GM  soybeans decreases to $5.58 per 
bushel. A  spread between non-GM and GM  soybeans of $0.30 per bushel is reasonably 
consistent with anecdotal evidence of the spreads  observed at  the farm level. For example, 
Miranowski et al. report that non-GM soybeans have received premiums of  between 
$0.05 and $0.35 per bushel. 
It may seem curious that the non-GM price premium is larger than the cost of 
producing non-GM soybeans. The cost of  producing non-GM soybeans, assuming an 
average yield of  38 bushels per acre and $6 per acre higher cost, suggests a $0.16 per 
bushel higher cost for non-GM soybean production. However, the acreage decision by an 
individual producer is based on expected net revenues, and therefore takes account of 
covariability between a producer's price and yield. 
Specifically,  the equilibrium condition for the farmer's planting decision is given by: 
'  The numerical solution methods and simulations  were conducted using code written in GAUSS (available  upon request 
from the authors). 
Although the no-segregation  simulation does not distinguish between GM  and non-GM crops, if producers did have the 
opportunity to grow GM  soybeans with no price discount, then dl production would be GM  because of the cost savings. McNew and Smith  Segregation of Grain Markets: Consequences  for Price Behavior  41 
Table 1. Simulation Results With Segregation and Without Segregation of 
GM and Non-GM Soybeans 
Variable 
With Segregation 
Without  (SCENARIO  1) 
Segregation  GM  Non-GM 
Price ($/bushel)  5.80 
(0.053) 
Std. Dev. of Price ($/bushel)  0.69 
(0.032) 
Stocks (mil. bushels)  90.8 
(11.9) 
Std. Dev. of Stocks (mil. bushels)  137.1 
(13.7) 
Acreage (%I 
Correlation of Price 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
where m is the  cost savings of producing GM soybeans. This can be rewritten in terms 
of the expected price spread and the covariance of prices with yields as: 
Ifthe  covariance terms offset each other such that Cov[P~,Y,+,]  = COV[P~~Y,+,I,  then  the 
expected price spread, E(Ptl, -  P:,),  equals the expected cost per bushel, ml(Y,+,). How- 
ever, from our simulation, the term Cov[P~,Y,+,]  -  Cov[P~,Y,+,I  is positive, suggesting 
expected non-GM price must increase relative to the expected GM price to offset the 
covariances and maintain the acreage equilibrium ~ondition.~ 
Another important point to  note is  that  the  non-GM premium varies from year to  year 
and exhibits a substantial degree of variability. Figure 1, which shows a sample time 
path of prices for GM and non-GM soybeans, illustrates this point. Both price series 
have a tendency to move in  the same  direction, but the spread is  not constant.' From the 
simulation results presented in table 1, the annual correlation coefficient between the 
GM and non-GM soybean prices is 0.798. Thus, although GM and non-GM prices have 
a tendency to move together, they are by no means perfectly correlated. Based on this 
finding, separate forward pricing markets may be required for GM and non-GM soy- 
beans to provide adequate risk management protection. 
The fact that producers account for covariability between price and yield has been illustrated by Williams and Wright 
(p. 34) in their discussion of a producer incentive price, which differs from the expected price in making planned output 
decisions under uncertainty. 
In figure 1, a few instances exist where non-GM prices and GM prices diverge substantially. These divergences occur 
because of the inability to substitute GM soybeans for non-GM soybeans in the non-GM market. Large negative demand 
shocks in the GM market andtor large positive demand shocks in the non-GM market can create relative shortages in the 
non-GM market. 42  April2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 1. Simulated prices for GM and non-GM soybeans 
Comparing the results for the two simulations reported in table 1  also illustrates that 
price variability is higher for non-GM soybeans and lower for GM  soybeans when the 
market is segregated. On average,  however, there is no substantial change in the overall 
variability of  soybean prices in the segregation scenario (in which the standard devia- 
tions for the GM  price and non-GM price are 0.66 and 0.70, respectively) as compared 
to the no-segregation scenario  (where  the standard deviation of the undifferentiated soy- 
bean price is 0.69). With segregation,  in the aggregate  more stocks are carried than when 
there is no segregation. Total stocks (GM and non-GM) average 118 million bushels in 
the segregation scenario and only 90.8 million bushels in the no-segregation scenario. 
This is a consequence of  separating out the demand elasticities and demand shocks for 
the GM  and non-GM markets. The own-price elasticity of  demand is much larger in 
absolute value in the non-GM market than in the GM  market. 
However, the non-GM market also experiences much larger stochastic  demand shocks. 
In the scenario for which results are  reported in table 1,  the larger demand shocks experi- 
enced in the non-GM market offset the price variability dampening effects which result 
from a more elastic demand function for non-GM varieties. Consequently, relatively large 
stocks of  non-GM varieties are held. 
A further issue is the nature and volatility of  the price spread between non-GM and 
GM  soybeans. The simulation results presented in figure 1  for the scenario reported in 
table 1  reveal that price spreads tend to be largest in years when prices are relatively 
low, and smallest in years when prices are relatively high. For example, when the per 
bushel price of  GM  soybeans is $5, the average price premium for non-GM soybeans is 
$0.30, but when the price of  GM  soybeans is $7, the average price premium for non-GM 
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To assess the sensitivity of  these results to changes in the parameters of  the model, 
we conducted simulations of  four additional scenarios  (scenarios  2,3,4,  and 5) in which 
the markets for GM  and non-GM soybeans are segregated. Results for each of  these 
scenarios are  presented in table 2, and are compared with the initial market segregation 
scenario from table 1. 
Scenario 2 assumes consumers are willing to pay a premium for non-GM soybeans if 
there is credible information to show the varieties are segregated. In scenario 2, this 
effect is represented by a permanent vertical shift in the non-GM demand function of 
$0.30 per bushel. 
In scenario 3, demand shocks for both the GM  and non-GM varieties are assumed to 
be identical. Specifically, we utilized the demand shock for the aggregate demand func- 
tion as the demand shock for the GM  and non-GM demand functions-i.e.,  the shocks 
to export demand and domestic demand are identical in each of  the 1,000 replications 
for this scenario. 
Scenario  4 utilizes demand parameter estimates  from the 1970-1984 period. The GM 
demand from this time period is more elastic than the post-1985 period, while the non- 
GM  demand is less elastic than in the baseline scenario. The elasticity estimates used 
for scenario 4 are -0.56 for GM  demand and -0.84 for non-GM demand. Along with dif- 
fering elasticities, the 1970-1984 period exhibits larger demand shocks than the base- 
line scenario. Finally, Scenario 5 considers the case of  higher storage costs for non-GM 
soybeans as compared to GM  soybeans. 
In scenario 2, the permanent $0.30 per bushel vertical increase in the demand for non- 
GM varieties causes the average price for non-GM varieties to increase, but also induces 
an increase in the GM price. There is a modest acreage shift from GM  to non-GM soy- 
beans. As a result, the non-GM price premium only increases by $0.18 (from $0.30 in 
scenario 1  to $0.48 in scenario 2) even though the non-GM vertical demand shift is $0.30 
per bushel. The degree of  price correlation between GM  and non-GM soybeans also 
increases from 0.798 to 0.858. 
In scenario 3, in which export and domestic demand shocks for GM and non-GM vari- 
eties are assumed to be identical, the effect is to substantially reduce storage of non-GM 
soybeans and slightly increase storage of  GM  soybeans. The reason is that, in compar- 
ison to the baseline scenario, the average size of demand shocks in the non-GM market 
has decreased  while the average size of demand shocks  in the GM market has increased. 
The price spread, however, is largely unaffected by this change, although the prices of 
non-GM and GM  varieties are slightly more correlated (the correlation coefficient is 
0.822 in scenario 3 and 0.798 in scenario 1). 
Scenario  4 considers the case when GM demand is more elastic and non-GM demand 
is less elastic. Both GM and non-GM demand have larger demand shocks. In this case, 
both prices increase slightly, but the price spread does not change substantially. Because 
of larger demand shocks in both the GM and non-GM markets, price volatility increases 
slightly and the correlation between the GM  and non-GM prices decreases marginally 
as compared to the baseline of  scenario 1. 
The introduction of  segregation along GM  and non-GM variety lines is likely to lead 
to higher storage costs from testing, cleaning, and handling to assure the integrity of 
non-GM soybeans. Such costs would likely be borne by non-GM producers, although 
even storage costs for GM  varieties may increase as the available supply of  storage 
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We consider the extreme case of storage costs increasing by 50% (from 1$  per month 
to 1.5$ per month) in only the  non-GM market,  while GM storage costs remain the same 
at 1$ per month in the GM market. These results are presented as scenario 5 in table 
2. As expected, higher non-GM storage costs lead to lower non-GM inventories and more 
price variability. The GM variety is  indirectly affected as  well by higher non-GM storage 
costs as  inventories decline slightly and price variability increases slightly. This result 
is due to the substitution possibilities between GM and non-GM varieties in cases of 
extreme high prices. 
These general findings suggest that the price spread between GM and non-GM soy- 
beans is not constant, and that a plausible range for the correlation coefficient between 
the GM and non-GM prices is 0.80 to 0.85. Thus, although market prices for GM and 
non-GM varieties are  still  reasonably correlated, movements in those prices may be sufFi- 
ciently dissimilar to warrant separate forward pricing markets for GM  and non-GM 
soybeans. We turn  now to an  investigation of the  Tokyo Grain Exchange where separate 
contracts for GM and non-GM soybeans have been traded since May 2000. 
Evidence from the Tokyo  Grain Exchange 
The Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE)  is a commodity futures market that trades corn, soy- 
beans, azuki beans, arabica coffee, robusta coffee, and raw sugar. The soybean futures 
contract is a 30,000-kilogram (1,100  bushels) contract, which can be settled by physical 
delivery with warehouse receipts for designated facilities in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, 
and Saitama. A unique feature of this contract is that the soybeans  must be of U.S. origin. 
In  May of 2000, the TGE introduced a non-GM soybean futures contract and changed 
the existing soybean futures contract to be delivered with GM or mixture of GM and  non- 
GM soybeans. Like the  standard soybean contract, the  non-GM contract calls for delivery 
of U.S.-origin soybeans to approved warehouse facilities in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, 
and Saitama. The one subtle difference between the two contracts is  their size; the non- 
GM contract is for 10,000 kilograms (360 bushels) as compared to the 30,000-kilogram 
standard soybean contract. 
Since its inception in May of  2000, trading activity in the non-GM soybean contract 
has been robust by most measures. By September 2001,40% of  all tradingvolume and 
47% of all open contracts for soybeans have been for non-GM soybeans on a kilogram 
basis. Thus, based on trading activity, it would appear there is significant demand by 
commercial users for pricing non-GM soybeans.8 
To explore the correlation between GM and  non-GM futures prices, we collected daily 
closing price data from the TGE website from May 2000 to September 17,2001. Prices 
for all contracts from the GM and non-GM futures market, which are reported in yen 
per 1,000 kilograms, were converted into a U.S. measure of dollars per bushel using the 
spot rate for the Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar. Figure 2 shows the nearby contract 
prices for GM and non-GM soybean futures for the period November 2000 to September 
2001. 
As observed from figure 2, although the contract prices for the two commodities tend 
to move together, the spread between them shows a tendency to narrow or widen quite 
a Holbrook Working, in 1954, was one of the first to point out that futures markets are vehicles for hedging and that a 
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Figure 2. Tokyo Grain Exchange nearby soybean futures 
prices, in U.S.  dollars 
significantly over this time peri~d.~  For the entire sample, the correlation between the 
two prices is 0.903. Within this short time period, the premium for non-GM soybeans 
appears to decrease (increase)  as the overall soybean price level increases (decreases). 
This is consistent with the findings reported in the simulations where higher prices 
were associated with a smaller spread between non-GM and GM soybeans. 
Table 3 shows the correlation between the Tokyo Grain Exchange GM  and non-GM 
soybean futures contract prices for different delivery months. The five contracts that 
have expired demonstrate a wide range of correlation estimates, from 0.65 to 0.95, with 
an average of 0.81 for all contracts over the sample. These correlation  estimates are also 
reasonably consistent with the simulation results (as  shown in table 2) where the range 
of  correlations is from 0.80 to 0.85. 
Conclusions 
As grain markets move from homogeneous to heterogeneous products, it is important 
to understand how pricing behavior will change. In this study, we have explored the 
implications  for market price behaviors of market segregation  between GM and non-GM 
soybeans using a stochastic  dynamic simulation model similar in approach to a competi- 
tive storage model developed by Williams and Wright for a single commodity. As there 
are  no closed-form solutions  for the unknown functionals,  the stochastic model is solved 
'  Parcell found similar patterns based on an earlier subset of these data from May  2000  to December 2000. McNew and Smith  Segregation of Grain Markets: Consequences  for Price Behavior  47 
Table 3. Correlation Between Non-GM and GM Soybean 







Average for expired contracts 
Correlation of  No. of 
Futures Prices  Observations 
0.651  150 
0.835  190 
0.950  223 
0.780  257 
0.835  262 
0.810 
numerically for each set of model parameters. Monte Carlo simulations were utilized 
to examine the impacts of  random shocks on both yields and market demands to 
characterize price behaviors in different market settings. These market settings 
included the baseline situation in which the markets for GM and non-GM soybeans 
are  not segregated, and alternative scenarios where GM and non-GM soybeans are 
segregated. 
The demand side of the model was parameterized by assuming the export market for 
U.S.-produced soybeans represents the demand for non-GM soybeans while the U.S. 
domestic market represents the demand for GM  soybeans, and then estimating econo- 
metric models of  these separate demands. One important finding is that while the 
estimated own-price  elasticity of demand for the domestic market obtained in this study 
(-0.31) is relatively small and quite similar to previously reported estimates, the 
estimated own-price elasticity of  export demand (-1.61) is substantially larger than a 
previously reported estimate by Gardiner and Dixit (-0.96). The difference in these esti- 
mates can probably be attributed to important changes in the soybean export market as 
a result of expanded production in South America in the 1990s,  which are accounted for 
in the data used in this study. The econometric results also indicate that the estimated 
standard error for the export demand hnction is larger than for the domestic demand 
function. Jointly, these empirical findings imply that the demand for non-GM soybeans 
is more price-elastic and more volatile than the demand for GM  soybeans-a  result 
having important implications  for price behavior when the two markets are segregated. 
The simulation results provide new insights about potential price behaviors for GM 
and non-GM commodities. 
First, not surprisingly given that production costs for GM  soybeans are assumed 
to be lower, over time the introduction of  market segregation results in a lower 
average price for GM  soybeans ($5.58 per bushel) and a higher price for non-GM 
soybeans ($5.88 per bushel) than when the market is not segregated ($5.80 per 
bushel). 
Second, the results also indicate GM  and non-GM prices are not separated by  a 
constant premium for non-GM soybeans equal simply to the difference in per unit 
production costs. Instead, the price spread tends to vary significantly from year 
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spreads estimated in the Monte Carlo simulations is quite similar to premiums 
actually observed at the farm level in the United States (Miranowski et al.). In 
addition, in the simulations for alternative segregated market scenarios, the 
estimated correlation between the prices of non-GM and GM  soybeans is relatively 
high, between 0.798 and 0.858, but not equal to one. This finding suggests there is 
the potential for separate futures markets for non-GM and GM  soybeans. The 
estimated correlations are quite similar to those actually observed between prices 
for commodities such as spring wheat and winter wheat, for which separate futures 
markets currently exist. 
Third, the average price spread between non-GM and GM  soybeans was almost 
twice as large as the difference in unit production costs between non-GM and GM 
soybeans. This is because the negative covariance of  prices and yields resulting 
from both yield and demand shocks is larger in absolute terms for non-GM soy- 
beans than for GM  soybeans. A sensitivity analysis  revealed that  even when demand 
shocks in the non-GM (export)  market and the GM (domestic)  market were assumed 
to be similar, the estimated average price spread was largely unaffected. 
m Fourth, the simulation  results suggest market segregation will result in substantial 
increases in stockholding with commensurate increases in storage costs. In the 
absence of segregation,  the average annual amount of total combined stock holdings 
of both GM  and non-GM soybeans is 90.8 million bushels. When market segrega- 
tion is introduced, total stock holdings of both non-GM and GM  stocks increase by 
30% to an annual average of  118 million bushels. The increase in stock holding 
occurs largely because of increased holdings of non-GM stocks in response to larger 
demand shocks associated with the (now segregated) export market. The results 
obtained in the model simulations were compared with evidence from the Tokyo 
Grain Exchange, where non-GM and GM  soybean futures contracts have traded 
simultaneously since May 2000. The evidence from the Tokyo Grain Exchange 
contracts is largely consistent with the results of the simulation model. Price corre- 
lations between the Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GM and GM  soybean contracts 
tended to be similar in magnitude to those found in our simulations. In addition, 
both the correlations and spreads between prices appear to change rather dramati- 
cally over the short time period examined. 
The evidence from this study indicates that the price behaviors of  GM  and non-GM 
soybeans exhibit important differences. Moreover, this is also likely to be the case for 
other commodities such as corn and wheat, for which GM varieties are currently or will 
shortly be available. Market participants, many of whom operate in competitive  markets, 
will need information on both GM  and non-GM prices as well as other market informa- 
tion, such as production and inventories, to make optimal production and marketing 
decisions. An important issue for policy makers is therefore the allocation of  resources 
to provide publicly available data on these markets. 
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Appendix: 
Description of Econometric Models, 
Estimation Methods, and Results 
Estimates of U.S. export and domestic demand elasticities for soybeans are required for parameter- 
ization of the simulation model. Previous estimates of export demand elasticities may be too small for 
current market conditions because they were obtained using time-series data prior to the mid-1980s, 
and thus do not reflect expanded international competition in U.S.  export markets from increased 
production in South America in the 1990s. The econometric approach used here is to estimate a simul- 
taneous set of demand and supply equations for the export and domestic markets for U.S.  soybeans. 
For the export market model, we follow the approach of Haniotis, Baffes, and Ames. In the export 
demand equation, export quantity demanded is specified as a function of  price and demand shift 
variables, including the  exchange rate. The export supply function is expressed in price-dependent form 
where the export price depends upon quantity exported and domestic supply (including  current 
production and carry in stocks). Given that the empirical focus is the estimation of  export demand 
parameters, the specification of the export supply function can be viewed as permitting the selection 
of an appropriate set of instrumental variables to permit the estimation of unbiased parameters in  the 
export demand function. 
The specific export demand and supply estimation equations are as follows: 
ln(X,) = a,  + alln(P,) + a,ln(E,)  + a,ln(W,)  + U,, 
Equation (Ala)  is the export demand function and (Alb)  the export supply function. The variables in 
equations (Ala)  and (Alb)  are the U.S. average soybean price (P),  the quantity of U.S. soybean exports 
(X), world ending stocks (W), the U.S. supply of soybeans (S)  computed as the beginning stocks plus 
production and any imports for the year, and E is the trade-weighted real exchange rate index for 
soybeans, as  constructed by the USDA's Economic Research Service.''  Because an  increase in the value 
of E represents an increase in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies, we would expect 
E to be negatively related to exports. The world stocks variable (W) is expected to negatively affect the 
demand for U.S. exports, as  higher world stocks imply a lower level of  demand for U.S. exports. In  the 
export supply equation, an increase in total U.S. supply is likely to increase the supply of U.S. exports 
and lower the export price. 
In the domestic market model, soybeans are used almost exclusively for the production of soybean 
meal and soybean oil. Every 60-pound bushel of  soybeans yields approximately 48 pounds of  soybean 
meal and 11 pounds of soybean oil. Soybean meal is widely used in feed rations (Smith).  Therefore, the 
domestic demand for soybeans (D,) is assumed to depend on the U.S. annual production of  all meat 
(beef, pork, and poultry), M,.  As meat supplies increase, the demand for soybeans is also likely to 
increase. The domestic market is represented as follows: 
(Mb)  h(P,)  = 6,  + 6,ln(Dt) + 6,ln(S,) + z,. 
With the  exception of the exchange  rate  variable, data for all of the dependent and explanatory variables 
utilized in both the export and domestic demand and supply models were obtained from various issues 
of the USDA's 'World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimatesn  (USDAIWorld Agricultural Outlook 
Board). The exchange rate datawere obtained from the USDA/ERS website (available at  www.ers.usda. 
gov/data/exchangerates~. 
10 The USDAfERS's trade-weighted exchange rate, an aggregate measure of the U.S. dollar exchange rate for all export 
and import countries that trade with the United States, is  utilized because the dependent export demand variable is aggre- 
gate U.S. soybean exports rather than exports to a specific country. McNew and Smith  Segregation of Grain Markets: Consequences  for Price Behavior  5 1 
Table  Al.  Domestic and Export Supply and Demand Estimates for Soybeans:  1970-1984 
and 1985-2000 
A. EXPORT  MAIUUCT 
Demand  I 
Estimate  t-Stat.b  Estimate 
Variable"  (1970-84)  (1970-84)  (1985-00)  (198540) 
Intercept  3.88  3.24  10.72  5.25 
pt  -0.84  -1.22  -1.61  -3.85 
Et  -0.05  -0.58  -0.13  -0.38 
wt  0.01  0.49  -0.04  -2.63 
C.V.'  22.5%  16.0% 
F-Test  for structural change in 
export market models  (0.003)  3.94  1 
Supply 
Estimate  t-Stakb  Estimate  t-Stat.b 
Variable" (1970-84) (1970-84) (1985-00) (198540) 
Intercept  3.04  3.06  8.06  2.21 
xt  0.84  2.46  0.32  3.17 
st  -0.89  -1.46  -1.08  -2.05 
"Variables: P,  = U.S. soybean price, E,  = exchange rate, W,  = world stocks, X,  = U.S.  soybean exports, S,  = U.S. 
soybean supply, M,  = U.S.  meat (beef, pork, and poultry) production, and Dt  = domestic demand. 
bAsymptotic  t-statistics. 
'C.V.  = coefficient of variation, calculated as the root mean squared error of the regression divided by the mean of 
the dependent variable. 
The F-test is a test of  whether all coefficients in the demand and supply equations have changed (p-values are 
presented in parentheses). 
Demand 
Estimate  t-Stat.b  Estimate 
Variable"  (1970-84) (1970-84) (1985-00)  (1985-00) 
Intercept  -4.02  -4.30  -2.79  -3.23 
pt  -0.56  -3.35  -0.31  -3.87 
Mt  1.48  10.91  0.94  12.51 
C.V.'  11.7%  4.3% 
F-Testd  for structural change in  0.41 
export market models  (0.745) 
Parameter estimates for the two-equation export market model and the two-equation domestic 
market model were each estimated for the entire period 1970-2000 using three-stage least squares 
(3SLS)  procedures in SAS. In each model, the endogenous  variables are the soybean price and soybean 
quantities demanded. All other variables are exogenous and used as instruments in the estimation 
procedures. In both models, the estimated equations are either over-identified or exactly identified. 
Tests for serial correlation failed to reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation. Chow tests for 
structural  change between the  sample sub-periods of 1970-1984 (which approximately corresponds 
to the period utilized in Gardiner and Dixit in their estimates of export demand for U.S. soybeans) 
and 1985-2000 rejected the null hypothesis of no structural change for the export market model. 
However, Chow tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of no structural change for the domestic 
market model. 
Parameters for the models estimated for each of the two sample sub-periods are presented in table 
Al. The estimated parameters for the export and domestic demand equations have the expected signs 
and, with one exception (the parameter for the exchange rate, E,),  are also all statistically significant 
at  the 5% level. The estimated elasticity of export demand of -  1.61  for the period 1985-2000 is substan- 
tially larger in absolute terms than the estimate of -0.84 for the period 1970-1984. The latter estimate 
is very similar to the estimate of -0.96 reported by Gardiner and Dixit for a similar period prior to the 
mid-1980s. The domestic demand elasticity estimates of -0.56 and -0.31 for the periods 1970-1984 and 
1985-2000 are not dissimilar from the estimate of  -0.4 reported by Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky. 
supply 
Estimate  Estimate  t-Stat.b 
Variablea (1970-84) (1970-84) (1985-00) (1985-00) 
Intercept  4.21  4.85  7.39  4.42 
D,  0.92  2.91  0.87  2.80 
St  -2.82  -3.68  -1.53  -4.37 
C.V.'  17.6%  11.9% 52  April2003  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
Coefficients of variation for the export demand and domestic demand equations computed from the 
standard errors of the regressions are also reported in table  Al.  These coefficients of variation, estimated 
consistently with the export and domestic demand function parameters, are utilized to obtain distri- 
butions of  the domestic and export demand shocks required for the simulation models. Specifically, 
multiplying the estimated coefficient of variation for the domestic model and the export model by the 
average price over the sample of  $5.75 gives a standard deviation estimate for the distribution of  the 
demand shocks for each market. These standard deviation estimates are used to generate domestic and 
export demand shocks used in the simulation, which are assumed to be independent and normally 
distributed with zero means. 